Spinoza Bibliography

Published by the Spinoza-Gesellschaft e.V. and directed by Manfred Walther

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Eintrag Nr. 20059
Literature type Articles
Author Green, Keith
Title Spinoza on Affirmation, 'Anima' and Autonomy
Subtitle 'Shattered Spirits'
Title of magazine / anthology Spinoza and Relational Autonomy : Being with Others
Editor (surname first) Armstrong, Aurelia ; Green, Keith ; Sangiacomo, Andrea (Hrsg./eds.)
Place published Edinburgh
Publisher Edinburgh University Press
Year 2019
Pages [164]-193
Pages in total (of the volume) XI, 211
Contains bibliography 147-148
Language English
Thematic areas Anthropology / psychology / doctrine of affections / body and mind, Ethics, Theory of society
Subject E, TTP
Autopsy yes
Complete bibliographic evaluation yes
German commentary "... on Spioza's view, having (1) adequate ideas of one own's nature or power, (2) adequate ideas of the nature that cause one's motivationally salient affects, and (3) a knowledge of the conditions that optimise one's power to persevere and extend one's 'power of mind' are also reqired in order to 'own' the affects and desires that will move one to act to the end of one's own 'good' as well as that of other natures that agree with one's own. Spinoza anticipates not only a relational conception of autonomy, and not only for those whose 'autonomy' is merely phenomenal, but a conception of autonomy that presupposes a substantive conception of human 'good'." (p. 188)
English commentary "... on Spioza's view, having (1) adequate ideas of one own's nature or power, (2) adequate ideas of the nature that cause one's motivationally salient affects, and (3) a knowledge of the conditions that optimise one's power to persevere and extend one's 'power of mind' are also reqired in order to 'own' the affects and desires that will move one to act to the end of one's own 'good' as well as that of other natures that agree with one's own. Spinoza anticipates not only a relational conception of autonomy, and not only for those whose 'autonomy' is merely phenomenal, but a conception of autonomy that presupposes a substantive conception of human 'good'." (p. 188)
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