| Literatursorte | Aufsätze |
| Verfasser | Green, Keith |
| Titel | Spinoza on Affirmation, 'Anima' and Autonomy |
| Untertitel | 'Shattered Spirits' |
| Titel Zeitschrift / Sammelband | Spinoza and Relational Autonomy : Being with Others [s. Armstrong, Aurelia et. al.: Spinoza and Relational Autonomy, 2019] |
| Herausgeber AF | Armstrong, Aurelia ; Green, Keith ; Sangiacomo, Andrea (Hrsg./eds.) |
| Verlagsort | Edinburgh |
| Verlag | Edinburgh University Press |
| Jahr | 2019 |
| Seiten | [164]-193 |
| Umfang Seiten (des Bandes) | XI, 211 |
| Enthält Bibliografie | 147-148 |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Sachgebiete | Anthropologie / Psychologie / Affektenlehre / Körper und Geist, Ethik, Gesellschaftstheorie |
| Behandelte Werke Spinozas | E, TTP |
| Autopsie | ja |
| Vollständig bibliografisch ausgewertet | ja |
| Kommentar deutsch | "... on Spioza's view, having (1) adequate ideas of one own's nature or power, (2) adequate ideas of the nature that cause one's motivationally salient affects, and (3) a knowledge of the conditions that optimise one's power to persevere and extend one's 'power of mind' are also reqired in order to 'own' the affects and desires that will move one to act to the end of one's own 'good' as well as that of other natures that agree with one's own. Spinoza anticipates not only a relational conception of autonomy, and not only for those whose 'autonomy' is merely phenomenal, but a conception of autonomy that presupposes a substantive conception of human 'good'." (p. 188) |
| Kommentar englisch | "... on Spioza's view, having (1) adequate ideas of one own's nature or power, (2) adequate ideas of the nature that cause one's motivationally salient affects, and (3) a knowledge of the conditions that optimise one's power to persevere and extend one's 'power of mind' are also reqired in order to 'own' the affects and desires that will move one to act to the end of one's own 'good' as well as that of other natures that agree with one's own. Spinoza anticipates not only a relational conception of autonomy, and not only for those whose 'autonomy' is merely phenomenal, but a conception of autonomy that presupposes a substantive conception of human 'good'." (p. 188) |
| Link zu dieser Seite | http://spinoza.hab.de/detail.php?id=20059 |
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